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INTRODUCTION
In 1961, President Kennedy warned against official misconduct involving
ex parte communication, which he defined as undisclosed, informal contact
between an agency official and a party interested in a matter before that
official.' He echoed what courts had been saying for years: these influences
on agency action often do basic injury to the fairness of agency proceedings,
particularly when those proceedings are judicial in nature. 2 After grappling
with the problem for another fifteen years, Congress amended the Admini-
strative Procedure Act (APA) to prohibit certain ex parte communications.3
APA section 551 defines ex parte contact as "an oral or written communica-
tion not on the public record with respect to which reasonable prior notice to
all parties is not given, but it shall not include requests for status reports on
any matter or proceeding covered by this subchapter. ' '4 Congress made the
prohibition applicable only to sections 556-557 formal hearings and formal
rulemaking procedures, where the agency's organic statute requires rulemak-
ing "on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing.", 5 These rules
established modified trial-type procedures in which ex parte contacts are
inappropriate to the judicial model the rules follow. 6
Congress specifically omitted the prohibition from section 553 informal
rulemaking procedures, which are modeled after legislative process.7 The
procedures described in section 5538 allow for solicitation of information,
discussion and negotiating characteristic of legislative formulation of statutes
of general applicability. This section essentially requires publication of the
proposed rules in the Federal Register, followed by an opportunity for inter-
1. Special Message to the Congress on Conflict of Interest Legislation and on Problems of Ethics in
Government, 1961 PUB. PAPERS 326.
2. Id. at 331.
3. Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976) [codified at 5 U.S.C.
§§ 556-557 (1976)].
4. 5 U.S.C. § 551(14) (1976).
5. 5 U.S.C. §§ 556(d) and 557(d) (1976).
6. H.R. REP. NO. 94-990, Part II, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2183, 2227. See also Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468,480 (1936) (while predating the APA, the
case states well the principles behind the administrative hearing).
7. Hearings Before Subcommittee on Reorganization, Research and International Organizations of
Committee on Government Operations, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 214-15, 219, 248-49 (1974) (testimony urging that
the ex parte contact prohibition be limited to formal agency action and distinguishing formal agency action from
informal rulemaking procedures). See also Comment, Ex parte Contacts in Informal Rule Making: The "Bread
and Butter" of Administrative Procedures, 27 EMORY L. J. 293 (1978).
8. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
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ested persons to submit to the agency written and, in some cases, oral com-
ments on the rules.
While no one has seriously challenged an agency's right to engage in ex
parte communications in informal rulemaking procedures, 9 the APA does not
give agencies or courts any specific guidance in determining when ex parte
contacts are unacceptable. In the absence of specific standards for ex parte
contacts, courts have evaluated these informal communications within a
framework of basic fairness and democratic principles, requiring government
accountability and reasoned decisionmaking.' ° They have not inquired deeply
into ex parte contacts in particular situations unless there has been some
evidence of contacts thwarting the purposes of the APA procedures." In
addition, participants in the administrative process have emphasized the
importance of agencies' eschewing the appearance of impropriety suggested
by secretive activities and of maintaining public confidence in agency
actions.'
In general, recent court decisions 3 and the APA amendments' 4 signal a
trend toward more openness in government and increasing pressures by spe-
cial nonindustry and public interest groups demanding greater rights of partic-
ipation in formulating agency policy. This Comment will examine three recent
cases involving the Federal Communications Commission, cases which have
been concerned largely with the Commission's reliance on exparte communi-
cation in its decisionmaking process. Part I will discuss the peculiar statutory
mandates to the FCC, which make ex parte communication a method of
effecting policy particularly appealing to the Commission. Part II will set out
the three cases to be discussed. Following the cases, the three situations will
be compared in Part III in terms of traditional ex parte contacts analysis. It
will be shown that when the direction of the communication is predominantly
from the government to the regulated industry, other dimensions of the infor-
9. Although Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977),
found all ex parte contact in informal rulemaking impermissible, that decision has been distinguished and
limited, leaving little doubt that ex parte contacts are acceptable in the informal rulemaking context.
10. See Courtaulds (Alabama), Inc. v. Dixon, 294 F.2d 899 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (party seeking to overturn
agency action had also made ex parte contacts with agency; decided on theory of fairness, not on unclean
hands); Sangamon Valley Television Corp. v. United States, 269 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (basic fairness
requires that proceedings involving competing private claims to a valuable privilege be carried on in the open
and not ex parte); Van Curler Broadcasting Corp. v. United States, 236 F.2d 727 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 935 (1956) (no evidence that agency was swayed by ex parte contacts resulting in unfair treatment).
11. See cases cited in note 10 supra.
12. Testimony of former FCC Commissioner Glen 0. Robinson before House Government Information
and Individual Rights Subcommittee on Government in the Sunshine Act, H.R. REP. NO. 94-880, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 2 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2183, 2184.
13. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971); National Welfare
Rights Org. v. Finch, 429 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Office of Communications of the United Church of Christ v.
FCC, 425 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
14. Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966), as amended by Pub. L. No.
93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (1974) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976)); Federal Advisory Committee Act, Pub. L. No.
92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972) (codified at 5 U.S.C. App. (1976)) (requires opening to the public meetings of advisory
committees, study panels, and ad hoc committees in the executive branch); Government in the Sunshine Act,




mal contacts will have to be scrutinized to prevent government coercion and
promote government accountability in agency actions. The section concludes
with a discussion of ex parte communication as an extrastatutory tool of
regulation to effect agency policy. Concluding remarks appear in Part IV.
I. THE STATUTE
The Communications Act of 1934's is the statutory authority for the
FCC's regulation of broadcasting. Despite monumental changes in the tech-
nology, the Act remains virtually unchanged, 16 and commissioners, lawyers,
broadcasters, and others with broadcast interests are grappling with the same
old problems with the Act, as well as with new ones.
First, the Act gives no clear mandate in provisions that are concern-
ed with what is to be broadcast, unlike its help with the how. The Commission
is required to act in light of the "public convenience, interest, or necessity,"' 7
and "generally to encourage the larger and more effective use of radio [and
of course now, television] in the public interest."' 8 Unlike the monolithic,
identifiable "public" the drafters had in mind, the public has proved to be a
"gaseous vertebrate,"' 9 whose cause is championed by many competing
groups and whose needs are not homogeneous and cannot be met by some
Ten Commandments of broadcast regulation.20 Since "public interest" has
virtually no meaning in many policy-making situations, the FCC must ac-
quiesce to the definition of that term espoused by those with power over the
Commission. Congress need only say, "That is not what we mean by the
public interest," for the FCC to find appropriations on the line.2 '
Because the FCC does not have the resources to maintain a constant
adversary stance in its role of industry watchdog, it must rely to some extent
on industry cooperation to carry out its regulatory function. 22 Implicit in
industry cooperation is the requirement that the Commission weigh heavily
what the industry means by "the public interest."'
The real problems for the Commission come up when the demands of
those groups assuring its continued existence and smooth operation are in
15. 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1976)).
16. E. KRASNOW, THE POLITICS OF BROADCAST REGULATION 9 (1973).
17. 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1976).
18. 47 U.S.C. § 303(g) (1976).
19. Jaffe, The Individual Right to Initiate Administrative Process, 25 IOWA L. REV. 485, 498 (1940).
20. See B. COLE, RELUCTANT REGULATORS 63-81 (1978); E. KRASNOW, supra note 16 at 16-17;
Robinson, The Federal Communications Commission: An Essay on Regulatory Watchdogs, 64 VA. L. REV.
169, 193-95 (1978).
21. E. KRASNOW, supra note 16, at 16. Since Congress has been reluctant to update the 1934 Act, it has
used a variety of informal procedures to direct and oversee the Commission, including hearings, investigations,
and studies. The result is that these informal procedures escape review by the whole Congress and "enable
legislators to advance personal or constituent interests without the need for a full-scale political battle....
mhe FCC is constantly aware that it is an ann of Congress." Id. at 70.
22. Id. at 16, 31-36. See also Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1667, 1684-87 (1975).
23. E. KRASNOW, supra note 16, at 16; Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1684-87 (1975).
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conflict. This dilemma leads to decisions fashioned to produce as little politi-
cal conflict as possible.24 Hence, the Commission chairmen see themselves
not as leaders of an independent agency, but as negotiators of all divergent
positions, looking for the most politically acceptable policy and acting much
like congressional legislators.2
Second, the Act creates tension in its grant of authority to the FCC. On
the one -hand, it requires the Commission to regulate the broadcast media in
the public interest, which clearly requires some attention to program format
26
and content. On the other hand, section 326 of the Act clearly warns against
too much concern with program content27 since this content is protected by
the first amendment. 28 The Commission has been characterized as walking a
tightrope between the public interest and censorship. 2
One is left with an agency cautious in acting, eager to encourage industry
self-regulation, eager to avoid committing itself to rules, especially on poten-
tial constitutional questions, and eager to placate all of its "publics." It is
against this backdrop of statutory and political conditions that the three cases
herein are set.
II. THE CASES
The cases to be discussed include Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC,30 Action
for Children's Television, Inc. v. FCC,3' and Writer's Guild ofAmerica, West,
Inc. v. FCC. 2 The first two cases were heard on appeal of an FCC final order
in the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals. Writer's Guild was
brought in the United States District Court for the Central District of Cali-
24. E. KRASNOW, supra note 16, at 16-17 (citing A. LEISERSON, ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION: A
STUDY IN REPRESENTATION IN INTERESTS 16 (1942)): '[A] satisfactory criterion of the public interest is the
preponderant acceptance of administrative action by politically influential groups." See also Noll, Selling
Research to Regulatory Agencies, in THE ROLE OF ANALYSIS IN REGULATORY DECISION-MAKING: THE
CASE OF CABLE TELEVISION (R. Park ed. 1973).
25. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1633 (1975):
"Today, the exercise of agency discretion is inevitably seen as a legislative process of adjusting competing
claims of various private interests affected by agency policy." See also Williams, Securing Fairness and
Regularity in Administrative Proceedings, 29 AD. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1977).
26. FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470,475 (1940): "An important element of public interest
and convenience affecting the issue of a license is the ability of the licensee to render the best practicable service
to the community reached by his broadcasts." In National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190,
216-17 (1943), Justice Frankfurter elaborated:
The Commission's licensing function cannot be discharged, therefore, merely by finding that there are
no technological objections to the granting ofalicense. If the criterion of"public interest" were limited
to such matters, how could the Commission choose between two applicants for the same facilities,
each of whom is financially and technically qualified to operate a station? Since the very inception of
federal regulation by [sic] radio, comparative considerations as to the services to be rendered have
governed the application of the standard of "public interest, convenience, or necessity."
27. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1976).
28. See, e.g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
29. Banzhafv. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom. Tobacco Inst. v. FCC, 396
U.S. 842 (1969).
30. 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
31. 564 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1977) [hereinafter referred to as ACT].
32. 423 F. Supp. 1064 (C.D. Cal. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Writer's Guild of America, West, Inc. v. American
Broadcasting Co., 609 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980).
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fornia.33 All three cases raised substantial questions concerning the propriety
of ex parte contacts between the FCC and industry members during informal
rulemaking activities.
Home Box Office is raised simply to illustrate a case in which the tradi-
tional analysis' of ex parte contacts was appropriate. ACT and Writer's Guild
illustrate the inadequacy of the traditional analysis in another kind of circum-
stance in which exparte contacts are at issue. In comparing the approaches of
the two courts in the latter two cases to basically the same ex parte situation,
the problems of a strict application of the APA informal rulemaking proce-
dures will be illuminated.
A. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC
In Home Box Office, a pay cable television company challenged the FCC
procedures followed in the adoption of rules restricting and regulating pay
exhibition of programs on cable systems.35 The Commission had followed
APA section 553 informal rulemaking procedures. An additional, self-im-
posed rule cut off the submission of comments to the Commission by inter-
ested parties on the last day of oral testimony.36 Despite its own rule, the
Commission continued to receive undisclosed information from various
industry parties (and not from public intervenors) during the five months after
the closing of the record and prior to the announcement of the rules.37
After reviewing the number and nature of the ex parte contacts, the court
expressed concern for "undue industry influence over Commission proceed-
ings" and a fear that the rules were the result of compromise among the
competing industry forces, rather than an independent judgment made by the
Commission in the public interest.3a Not only was the court concerned with
the "inconsistency of secrecy with fundamental notions of fairness," but also
with the ex parte contacts' interference with effective judicial review.39 The
court pointed out that the effect of the ex parte contacts was to create an
official record for judicial review minus the apparently influential discussions
between industry and the Commission, making it difficult for the court to
determine the rationality of the Commission's final rules.
40
33. The court found that it had jurisdiction and that the FCC did not have exclusive jurisdiction. Because
there had been no agency "proceeding" or "order," the review provisions of the Communications Act had not
been triggered. 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1074-84 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
34. The "traditional analysis" is concerned with basic fairness in agency decision making, undue industry
influence on agency actions, and occasionally with whether an administrative record is sufficient to facilitate
effective judicial review. The concern is for the regulated industry's attempts to influence the regulatory body.
See generally Nathanson, Report to the Select Committee on Ex Parte Communications in Informal Rule-
making Proceedings, 30 AD. L. REV. 377 (1978).
35. 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
36. Id. at 53.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 54.
40. Id.
19811
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B. Action for Children's Television v. FCC
In ACT, the court again faced the issue of ex parte contacts. 41 The
"kidvid" controversy arose in 1970 when Action for Children's Television
(ACT), a nonprofit Massachusetts corporation, requested that the FCC con-
sider proposals for regulations for children's television, primarily in the area
of commercial sponsorship of those programs.4 2 In particular, it urged: (1)
that there be no sponsorships and no commercials on children's programs;
(2) that no performer or children's show host be permitted to use or mention
products, services, or stores by brand names during children's programs; and
(3) that daily programs for children be provided, with no fewer than 14 hours
per week of children's programming, with certain times of the day designated
for each age category (preschool, primary ages six to nine, and elementary
ages ten to twelve).4 3
The Commission treated the proposal as a petition for rulemaking and
issued a notice inviting comments on the suggested rules. The enormous
response found, predictably, members of the public supporting the rules and
members of the industry objecting to them.44 The FCC decided to conduct its
own study, held public hearings, collected both written and oral comments,
and eventually issued detailed findings supporting its decision not to promul-
gate rules.45 Its primary reason was the industry's "willingness to improve the
quality of children's television by self-regulation."
46
The self-regulation the report referred to was the changes the National
Association of Broadcasters (NAB), the industry's trade association, had
made in its television code, which NAB members are required to follow.47
The main thrust of the reforms included limiting (but not eliminating) the
amount of commercial time accompanying children's programs, restricting
host or hero selling, clearly separating programs and advertising content, and
changing commercials to comport with safety standards and to eliminate cer-
tain deceptive selling practices.48 Satisfied with the industry efforts, the Com-
mission commended industry self-regulation but warned twice that if self-
regulation failed to reduce the level of advertising during children's pro-
gramming, per se rules or some other unspecified agency action would be
necessary.49
ACT formally requested that the FCC reconsider its decision not to adopt
rules.50 The Commission denied the request and ACT appealed to the court of
41. 564 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
42. Id. at 461.
43. Id. at 462.
44. Id. at 463.
45. For more information on the controversy, see B. COLE, RELUCTANT REGULATORS 242-310 (1978).
46. Children's Television Report and Policy Statement, 50 F.C.C.2d 1 (1974), cited in 564 F.2d 458, 464
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (hereinafter referred to as Report].
47. National Association of Broadcasters, Television Code (first issued in 1952).
48. 564 F.2d 458, 464 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
49. Report, supra note 46, at 13-14.
50. 564 F.2d 458, 468 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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appeals.5 1 ACT condemned the FCC's failure to solicit comments on the
industry's self-regulation proposals, which were negotiated behind closed
doors in Chairman Wiley's office and which the industry was coerced into
accepting in the face of threatened regulatory action.52 They charged that such
acts undermined legal administrative process, particularly in denying public
participation at every stage of the regulatory process. In addition, they claim-
ed that since the informal negotiations with the NAB were off-the-record, the
record the court was reviewing was devoid of information on which the in-
dustry self-regulation policy was based. They claimed that the ex parte con-
tacts made the extensive comment gathering stage "little more than a sop."
53
Step by step the court countered ACT's charges, pointing out that the
FCC had followed not only the letter of the law, but had even gone beyond the
bare requirements by holding public hearings and subsequent oral argument.'
The court found that the Commission had been in substantial compliance with
the APA procedures, and while ACT had not had any input in the industry
self-regulation decision, it had been given what it was entitled to, namely,
meaningful participation in the rulemaking process. 5
In addition, the court commended the Commission for issuing its lengthy
report, which was more than the minimum explanation required by the APA.
The report contained evidence that ACT's participation in the overall pro-
ceedings had been influential in the Commission's final decision. 6
As for ACT's charge concerning secret meetings between the Commis-
sion and the NAB, the court said that while the meetings might have been
"impolitic," they did not constitute an abuse of the agency's discretion.57
Addressing ACT's charge of coercion of industry compliance with the
FCC's self-regulation decision, the court basically defended the Commis-
sion's action as completely within its discretion." It affirmed the Commis-
sion's right to have discussions with industry members in a "general effort to
have its regulatees conform to their public service obligations" and implicitly
approved FCC efforts to effect "salutary self-regulation.",
59
The court conceded that there could be times when agency efforts to
encourage licensees to meet their public service responsibilities could involve
undue pressure from the agency; such "jawboning" would be considered an
improper exercise of agency discretion. It felt, however, that there was no
evidence of coercion in this case and that whatever coercion the industry had




54. Id. at 471.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 473.
58. Id. at 471 n.27.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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C. Writer's Guild of America, West, Inc. v. FCC
In setting out to make changes in children's programming, Chairman
Wiley had acted with complete confidence that encouraging self-regulation
would meet no serious challenge in the courts.6' He was so encouraged with
the results of his "jawboning" efforts with the children's programming situa-
tion that he decided to follow basically the same tack in taking on violence and
sex in television.62
As with children's programming, regulating program content presented
ticklish constitutional problems. 63 Wiley had not wanted to get involved in
these areas, but the message from Congress was that if the Commission did
not act to control violence and sex, punitive measures would be taken against
the Commission.64
In June, 1974, the House Appropriations Committee ordered the FCC to
report to that group by December 1974 on what measures the Commission
could legally take to protect children from excessive programming of violence
and obscenity. 65 Wiley was convinced that the Commission could not estab-
lish program content standards for granting licenses and renewals that were
proscribed under section 326 of the Communications Act. 66 To his thinking,
the only available alternative was to attempt to effect changes in the NAB
Code as he had done with children's programming. 67 Making this task difficult
were the time constraints Congress had placed on him. The shaping of the
children's commercial rule changes in the Code covered a period of approx-
imately five years of in-depth investigation and negotiations.6 For this next
task, Wiley did not even have enough time to meet APA procedural require-
ments. 69 He embarked, therefore, on a program of negotiating with the net-
works without notice to or participation from any other groups potentially
interested in the outcome. 0
At one point, former commissioner Nicholas Johnson, who was then
serving as chairman of the National Citizens' Committee for Broadcasting,
wrote to Wiley asking that members of the Committee or other members of
the public be allowed to -attend the negotiating sessions with industry. Wiley
refused, saying that he saw no purpose in opening the meetings to groups such
as Johnson's. 71 He continued to negotiate, somewhat bolstered by support
from CBS president Arthur Taylor, who had been experimenting at CBS with
reduced violence in children's programming. 72
61. B. COLE, RELUCTANT REGULATORS 284 (1978).
62. Id.
63. Writer's Guild of America, West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1097 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
64. Id. at 1095.
65. Id. See also G. COWEN, SEE NO EVIL 86 (1979).
66. Writer's Guild of America, West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1095 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
67. Id. at 1097 n.39.
68. G. COWEN, SEE NO EVIL 85-93 (1979).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1101 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
72. Id. at 1100.
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What was apparent to each of the network heads with whom Wiley chose
to confer was that Congress was putting the heat on the Commission and that
Wiley meant to meet the December deadline. 73 It was clear that the networks
had better go along or the matter would be taken out of their hands and they
would be subject to either legislation or FCC rules, both of which were
heinous choices for the industry. Their flexibility and autonomy were in
jeopardy, the costs of compliance prohibitive.74 As a result, Wiley and the
network heads were able to cajole the NAB into adopting a policy which
became known as the family viewing hour, which provided that: (1) the hours
from 7 to 9 p.m. (6 to 8 p.m. central time) would be reserved for programs
"suitable for family viewing"; (2) on occasions when material inappropriate
for family viewing was to be shown during those hours, a notice of the
program's questionable content would be advertised in printed schedules
prior to the program's airing; and (3) during any viewing hours, stations would
alert viewers to programs when the material "might be disturbing to a signifi-
cant portion of the adult audience." '75 Having achieved the Code changes, the
FCC reported to Congress that in light of the amendments, no government
regulation in this sensitive constitutional area appeared to be necessary.76
As a result of these Code changes, some programs previously scheduled
for airing in the family viewing time slots either would have to be moved to a
later time or would have to be scrapped or reworked to avoid any possible
violations of the family viewing hour policy. The most exasperating problem
for writers and producers was that no one knew exactly what "inappropriate
for family viewing" meant.77 One network executive saw its effect as being
largely changes in language, such as the omission of the words "hell" and
"damn" heard so often coming from Archie Bunker's mouth.78 A censor for
the same network, working without guidance from his superiors or the NAB,
was enforcing a standard of avoiding material in programs that would embar-
rass "the most uptight parent that could be imagined.- 79
Faced with what they considered outrageous censorship, writers, direc-
tors, producers, and actors-most notably Norman Lear and his Tandem
Productions, a California corporation-initiated two suits, which were com-
bined in the United States District Court for the Central District of
California.0 They charged the FCC with violations of the first amendment,
the Communications Act of 1934, and the APA for failure to employ even the
barest minimum section 553 procedures in foisting the family viewing policy
on them. They charged the networks and the NAB with violation of the
Sherman Antitrust Act.8 ' In a lengthy, painstaking opinion, District Judge
73. G. COWEN, SEE NO EVIL 68 (1979).
74. Id. at 100-15. See also 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1099 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
75. 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1104 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
76. Report on the Broadcast of Violent, Indecent and Obscene Material, 51 F.C.C.2d 418 (1975).
77. 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1124-26 (C.D. Cal. 1976). See also G. COWEN, SEE NO EVIL 116-41 (1979).
78. 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1124-26 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1072.
81. Id.
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Ferguson found that the FCC had violated the first amendment and the APA,
but found that the Communications Act provided no private cause of action
for the plaintiffs .
The court held that the FCC, working in concert with the networks and
the NAB, had undermined the decentralized character of the broadcasting
system and had taken monopolistic control over television, imperiling the
rights of the plaintiffs and the "paramount" rights of viewers.83 The opinion
went on to point out that the purpose behind Congress' adopting the informal
rulemaking procedures of the APA was the recognition that members of the
industry and other interested parties had a right to participate in agency
decisions.' Congress assumed that the quality of decisions would be improv-
ed with such input. The court found that the Commission had completely
disregarded the required APA procedures in its role in the family viewing hour
negotiations, providing no notice and no opportunity for interested parties to
be heard.8 5
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit,s the
court never reached the first amendment and APA issues, but decided that the
district court had not had jurisdiction to hear the complaint under the doc-
trines of primary jurisdiction 7 and exhaustion of remedies.u It therefore
vacated the judgment and held in abeyance plaintiffs' claims against the pri-
vate defendants until the plaintiffs took their complaint against the FCC first
to the FCC and possibly on appeal to the District of Columbia Circuit.Y The
United States Supreme Court has refused to hear plaintiffs' appeal.9
For purposes of this Comment, what is important are the uncontroverted
facts of Wiley's negotiating with the industry without employing APA pro-
cedures in a matter of great public concern. The Commission's pressure on
82. Id. at 1084. The Supreme Court in Scripps-Howard Radio v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 14 (1942), held: "The
Communications Act of 1934 did not create new private rights. The purpose of the Act was to protect the public
interest in communications." Accordingly, it has been subsequently held that the FCC is the 'primary and
exclusive forum' in which to initiate complaints based on the Act. Ackerman v. Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc., 301 F. Supp. 628, 631 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
83. 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1143-44 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
84. Id. at 1151, (citing Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 412 F.2d 740, 744 (3rd Cir. 1969)).
85. 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1151 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
86. Writer's Guild of America, West, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Corp., 609 F.2d 355 (1979).
87. Id. at 363. Primary jurisdiction was explained in General American Tank Car Corp. v. El Dorado
Terminal Co., 308 U.S. 422, 433 (1940):
Primary jurisdiction applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play
whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme,
have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such a case judicial
process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its views.
The appellate court believed that the Communications Act provides such a regulatory scheme.
88. 609 F.2d 355, 363 (9th Cir. 1979). Likewise, the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies was explained in
General American Tank Car Corp. v. Eldorado Terminal Co., 308 U.S. 422, 433 (1940): "Exhaustion applies
where a claim is cognizable in the first instance by an administrative agency alone; judicial interference is
withheld until the administrative process has run its course." The Court was uncertain exactly which of the two
doctrines applied, but felt certain that at least one of them was a sufficient basis for requiring that plaintiffs'
complaint be presented to the FCC first. Id.
89. 609 F.2d 355, 358 (9th Cir. 1979). The statutory review procedure for those aggrieved by the FCC is set
out in 47 U.S.C. §§ 402(a) and 405 (1976).
90. 449 U.S. 824 (1980).
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the industry to adopt a family viewing policy, supported by agency threats to
regulate should self-regulation fail will also be discussed.
III. THE Ex PARTE CONTACTS
In much of the literature, ex parte contacts are treated as presenting
essentially the same issues as those raised in Home Box Office, namely, funda-
mental fairness and effective judicial review.9' The ex parte contacts in that
case were.industry attempts to influence the agency.9 But the nature of the ex
parte contacts in both ACT and Writer's Guild involved off-the-record
government attempts to influence private industry. 93 While concern remains
for giving a fair hearing to all interested parties, new concerns with un-
authorized and arbitrary government action arise, issues the traditional
analysis does not address.
In ACT, the court's finding that ex parte contacts were proper within the
scope of the APA allowed the FCC to escape responsibility for arguably
unconstitutional regulation which was (1) accomplished through informal
agency action rather than through the public procedures which were being
employed simultaneously; (2) implemented through a private party (the
NAB); and (3) backed by FCC threats. The major problems apparent when ex
parte contacts are employed as an extrastatutory method of adopting "rules"
are lack of government accountability and the danger of government
coercion.
There are three problems with the FCC's actions which potentially com-
promise government accountability. First, it is difficult to determine on whose
behalf the Commission was acting. Second, a government agency used the
private agency to accomplish what it believed it could not do, namely censor
program content. Third, since through the NAB the government had effected
censorship, licensees, writers, producers, and other aggrieved parties were left
without recourse against the government, the actual perpetrator of what prob-
ably was a first amendment violation.
A. The "Public Interest"-Accountable to Whom?
FCC action in both ACT and Writer's Guild was the result of basically the
same pressures: some public concern, long-standing concern by influential
congressmen, and the conclusions of a Surgeon General's report about the
adverse effects on children of violence in television. 94 If the public interest
standard requires the Commission to answer to the majority of the viewing
public, Commission efforts to clean up television have questionable support.
91. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9,56 (D.C. Cir. 1977); K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 6:18 (1978); Nathanson, Report to the Select Committee on Ex Parte Communications in Informal
Rulemaking Proceedings, 30 AD. L. REV. 377 (1978).
92. 567 F.2d 9, 56 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
93. See generally 423 F. Supp. 1064 (C.D. Cal. 1976); G. COWEN, SEE NO EVIL 85-93 (1979).
94. REPORT TO THE SURGEON GENERAL, TELEVISION AND GROWING UP: THE IMPACT OF TELE-
VISION VIOLENCE (1970).
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When ACT approached congressmen, most notably Senator John Pastore, it
had fewer than 200 members. 95 While its membership eventually grew and the
FCC received significant public comment on children's programming in re-
sponse to its notice of rulemaking, actual widespread public support for
changes in children's television was never clearly established.
One survey showed that forty percent of those interviewed were con-
cerned about violence and sex in television programming,9 but the same
study showed that only four to seven percent ever changed their children's
viewing to avoid unacceptable programs?9 In addition, CBS had experiment-
ed unilaterally with removing programs to which parents objected because of
their violent content. 98 Competing networks bought CBS's discarded pro-
grams, aired them opposite CBS's new improved children's shows, and took
away CBS's audience with the supposedly objectionable programs.9 Pro-
grams thought to be unacceptable were the money-makers; they were suc-
ceeding in a system with exacting accountability-the marketplace.
If the "public interest" of concern to the FCC was not the interests of a
majority of viewers, the question of whose interest it was representing re-
mains. ACT was not satisfied with the FCC's representation of its members'
interests.
In Writer's Guild, the district court also questioned on whose behalf the
Commission was acting.' ° It made reference to a portion of Chairman Wiley's
testimony taken during the trial:
Q. (By the court) You know, there is a great movement afoot and the pressures
are getting bigger and bigger from what I sense of this trial that there [are] an awful
lot of parents who completely disagree with the approach the networks have
taken, and who don't have a voice and who can't present to the Chairman of the
FCC their point of view. They want a voice, they want to be heard and you
foreclosed them from being heard.
A. (Chairman Wiley) No, your Honor. I was speaking for them; that's the
thing. 1
0
Whether Chairman Wiley could accurately gauge public opinion, how-
ever, was not the issue. Rather the claim was that the Commission made no
public effort to be sure that it had acted in the public interest by hearing out
the public "through orderly process."'O°
B. The Whodunit - FCC or NAB?
The principle of government accountability is dealt another blow when
the FCC is able to require a private party, the NAB, to take action which the
95. B. COLE, RELUCTANT REGULATORS 252 (1978).
96. E. NOLL, ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF TELEVISION REGULATION 13 (1973).
97. Id.
98. Writer's Guild of America v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1094, 1150 (D.C. Cal. 1976); G. COWEN, SEE No
EVIL 76-79 (1979).
99. 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1094, 1150 (C.D. Cal. 1976); G. COWEN, SEE NO EVIL 76-79 (1979).
100. 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1151-52 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
101. Id. (emphasis added).
102. Id. at 1152.
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government believes cannot be compelled. In ACT, the court applied APA
section 553 strictly, using traditional ex parte contact analysis, thus camou-
flaging the FCC's influence on NAB Code changes.
The Writer's Guild district court cut through this charade and found
government action in similar FCC efforts to cause self-regulation. The court
cautioned that it was not objecting to the FCC's ever suggesting to the indus-
try a policy in tune with broadcasters' public interest responsibility.'0 3 It
recognized that this FCC practice when used properly was in conformity with
the statutory requirement that the FCC "generally encourage the larger and
more effective use of radio in the public interest."14
What it could not tolerate was the coercive tenor of these particular FCC
suggestions. It said that if the first amendment were to have any meaning for
broadcasters, licensees should have the right to reject any FCC suggestions
without fear of FCC retribution.'05 When the suggestions involve problems for
which formal regulation would be constitutionally questionable, the appear-
ance of government pressure would have to be avoided.'
6
The difference in the two courts' analyses of basically the same situation
is striking. In both ACT and Writer's Guild, the FCC chairman worked behind
the scenes to effect NAB Code changes to avoid the Commission's involve-
ment in a constitutionally sensitive area.'07 In ACT, the report announcing
FCC no-action warned that the failure of self-regulation would mean the
Commission would impose regulations on the industry.'08 The Commission
added questions to the license application to monitor each licensee's compli-
ance with Code changes.'09 In Writer's Guild, the Commission was threaten-
ing essentially the same terribles when it was attempting to create the family
viewing hour."°
Referring to the pending Writer's Guild district court decision, the ACT
court attempted to distinguish the supposedly different FCC approaches in
the two cases."' It described the FCC action in Writer's Guild as possibly
being a higher degree of encouragement, sufficient to constitute arm twisting
tactics, called "jawboning."" 2 Otherwise, it rested its distinctions primarily
on the absence of APA procedures in Writer's Guild. In a rather conclusory
manner, the court said that in the ACT proceedings, it was "satisfied that the
Commission did not coerce the industry into accepting agency-decreed poli-
cies or standards negotiated at closed door meetings.""
3
Even Chairman Wiley believed that he was using the same technique in
103. Id. at 1150.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1146, 1150.
106. Id. at 1150.
107. See text accompanying notes 52-79 supra.
108. Report, supra note 46, at 13-14.
109. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458, 467 (D.C.Cir. 1977).
110. 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1142, 1155-56 (C.D. Cal. 1976); G. COWEN, SEE NO EVIL 189-90 (1979).
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implementing the family viewing hour that he had used in the ACT negotia-
tions with the industry." 4 The major difference seems to be that in the ACT
situation, the Commission used APA procedures. In ACT, open threats to
force self-regulation were found acceptable. In Writer's Guild, similar threats
sub rosa were unacceptable. Despite procedural differences in the two cases,
the effect on the industry and the freeing of FCC from responsibility were
accomplished in the same way. When APA section 553 procedures shield
activities similar to those found unacceptable in Writer's Guild, they seem to
become window dressing.
Whether the court ignores ex parte contacts or chooses to find review-
able agency action therein is critical to the third accountability problem with
the FCC's informal action - legal recourse for the aggrieved parties. If
courts conclude that the Commission is not responsible for private regulation
induced by FCC threats, how will licensees, writers, and producers have any
recourse against government-initiated action? The question is whether the
FCC can avoid responsibility for what even it believes to be a probable
violation of the first amendment.
As the law stands now, the ACT decision is the rule, and the FCC is free
to circumvent its accountability by following APA procedures and taking full
advantage of ex parte communications channels. Should the plaintiffs decide
to pursue their claim through the FCC and appeal to the District of Columbia
Circuit, it will be difficult for the appellate court to resist the appeal of Judge
Ferguson's arguments if it is asked to review the family viewing hour negotia-
tions.
C. Extrastatutory Tools of Regulation
Of particular concern to the district court in Writer's Guild was the
FCC's skirting the informal rulemaking procedures of the APA." 5 It warned
that if the informal negotiating that had occurred were allowed to go on, the
APA's provisions would become meaningless.1 16 It went on:
The government could sit down at a table with the regulated industry, negotiate
policy, delegate to the industry the power to enforce the policy, mouth empty
words of congratulations about self-regulation, issue cynical denials of govern-
ment responsibility, and avoid the Act entirely. Such procedures would permit
government and industry to seal out the public from the decisionmaking process
and to frustrate judicial review. 117
The court objected to the FCC methods because they afford no protection to
the public, are not authorized by statute, and violate the long established rule
that when the Commission wishes to impose new duties on its licensees, it
114. B. COLE, RELUCTANT REGULATORS 284 (1978).





will always open the proposal to the public scrutiny and debate through the
prescribed rulemaking procedures.8
The Writer's Guild appellate court attempted to mollify the district
court's attack on the jawboning technique as a method of inducing industry
self-regulation."9 It referred to the "salutary effect of diminishing the need for
formal governmental intervention and regulation."' 20 It conceded that up-
holding these methods gives the FCC broad and largely uncontrolled admin-
istrative discretion in reviewing programming, which could be used to put
improper pressure on licensees.'
2
'
Despite this consession to the district court's concerns, the appellate
court declined to decide the issue of the appropriateness of jawboning in the
particular case, requiring instead that the plaintiffs follow Communications
Act and APA procedures in taking their complaint to the Commission before
initiating other judicial review." Still undecided by these cases is the legiti-
macy of extrastatutory agency action beyond simple information gathering.
Interestingly, the Writer's Guild district court was enamored of requiring
APA procedures in this case in order to avoid secretive government action
and particularly coercion. '2 Ironically, the presence of APA procedures in
ACT did not prevent secretive government action and coercion. Perhaps in-
formal agency actions are not intrinsically undemocratic and APA procedures
not a guarantee against arbitrary government action. There is something to be
said for negotiating with the regulated. Unlike the judiciary, the administra-
tive system does not necessarily function best as an adversary system, the
we-against-they posture. 24 While broadcasters are public trustees,25 they are
also businessmen. The public interest is not always at odds with broadcaster
interests. Because of the economic relationship between broadcasters and
viewers, broadcasters must be responsive to a significant number of viewers.
It is not in the public interest to regulate broadcasters to the degree that their
ability to make a profit is impaired. Government-imposed economic hardship
can diminish whatever quality already exists in television. If the country is to
maintain a commercial broadcast system, it is very much in the public interest
to keep the industry healthy and profitable. Therefore, in representing the
118. Id. (citing Yale Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 478 F.2d 594, 599 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
119. Writer's Guild of America v. American Broadcasting Co., 609 F.2d 355, 364 (9th Cir. 1979).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 365.
122. Id. at 363.
123. 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1073 (D.C. Cal. 1976).
124. Stewart discusses some attitudes of various groups toward formal adjudicatory proceedings as op-
posed to the informal rulemaking procedures. Ideally administrative action should provide for effective repre-
sentation by all interests affected with the minimum commitment of resources possible. Interestingly, while
informal consultation as is practiced by the British, SCHWARTZ & WADE, LEGAL CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT
98-101 (1972), seems potentially to meet those criteria, in practice public interest groups--those most often
excluded from the administrative process-prefer the formal procedures. The reason seems to be in large part
because they perceive the informal rulemaking procedure as consisting of exparte negotiations with the regulat-
ed industry and rather perfunctory attention to public interest input. Stewart, The Reformation of American
Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1667, 1775-76 (1975).
125. Writer's Guild of America v. American Broadcasting Co., 609 F.2d 355, 362 (9th Cir. 1979).
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public interest, the Commission is in a position that requires a balancing of
public needs and broadcaster needs. 2 6 In this view, a negotiating posture
makes more sense, although its legitimacy under the APA is doubtful.
While there is some argument that informal FCC action is authorized by
the charge of generally encouraging the larger and more effective use of
television in the public interest, the use of jawboning, speeches, and "raised
eyebrow" techniques is not authorized as a regulatory tool, is unstruc-
tured, and presents a strong possibility of arbitrary government action, espe-
cially in light of agency capture.'27 In addition to the problems of government
accountability and coercion already discussed, other difficulties arise when
these methods are used. For example, in testifying before the district court in
Writer's Guild, former commissioner Nicholas Johnson discussed the use of
speeches as a regulatory tool employed by the FCC.'8 He pointed out that
sometimes speeches were used to try out a Commission idea on the industry
and to begin a dialogue between the Commission and the industry; but others
were meant to announce incipient agency policy and could be called official
agency action. 129 He contended that the industry knew the difference.'3 Per-
haps in the context of ongoing agency-industry interchange, the industry can
distinguish between the two. Leaving agency action in the guessing game
stage, however, seems inconsistent with APA purposes and can leave a court
at sea in making the distinction, as was the case in Writer's Guild.
Another difficulty with both ACT and Writer's Guild so-called informal
action is that while the agency was claiming that it had adopted no policy or
rule, it was enforcing one. Some monitoring of licensee adherence to NAB
Code changes was anticipated, particularly by questions appearing on the
license application.' 3' Presumably, if the applicant did not meet some stand-
ard of children's or family programming, his receipt of the license was in
question. The bottom line is that the FCC is enforcing rules it has not formally
adopted. The reason for its not having adopted rules in ACT and Writer's
Guild is that it believed that it could not come up with constitutional stand-
ards. 32 In the Writer's Guild situation, the FCC wanted to avoid rulemaking
because, as a practical matter, standards for family programming would be
difficult to fashion. 33 No one could tell in many cases if a program was
126. Id.
127. "Capture" refers to the situation in which an agency is unduly influenced by the regulated industry.
Various reasons are cited as fomenting capture including personnel career exchanges between the agency and
regulated industry and insufficient agency resources resulting in agency reliance on industry information and
cooperation. For a general discussion of the capture phenomenon, see B. COLE, RELUCrANT REGULATORS
(1978); Robinson, The Federal Communications Commission: An Essay on Regulatory Watchdogs, 64 VA. L.
REV. 169, 189-93 (1978); Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667,
1683-87 (1975).
128. 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1120 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. ACT v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Writer's Guild of America v. FCC, 423 F. Supp.
1064, 1149-50 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
132. See text accompanying note 63 supra.
133. 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1126, 1149-50 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
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"appropriate for family viewing."'' Yet licensees were being required to
operate as if there were standards and their licenses potentially depended on
their guessing correctly.
The presence of proper agency procedures is not a guarantee against
improper agency action, as evidenced in ACT. The agency's formal action in
ACT was a no-action stance, yet the agency was revising its license applica-
tion to monitor children's programming.131 In order to get at the essence of the
agency's action, the court had to examine more closely the ex parte contacts
that took place. While it is not clear how closely the ACT court looked at the
informal communications, it is difficult to believe that had it scrutinized them
carefully, it would have found them acceptable.
IV. CONCLUSION
In ACT, the jawboning technique was used by the FCC to accomplish ex
parte what it believed it could not constitutionally accomplish through adopt-
ing rules. Because it followed APA section 553 procedures, however, giving
interested parties a fair hearing and providing the court with more than the
statutorily-required record, the Commission's action was found to be both fair
and legal.136 While theoretically the agency's ex parte contacts are not open
to judicial scrutiny beyond that exercised by the ACT court,'37 because of the
nature of the ex parte contacts, the court should have gone beyond the tradi-
tional ex parte contacts analysis. The traditional analysis makes more sense
when the ex parte influences are industry attempts to influence the agency,
contacts which may be decisive in formulating the rules but which are not
reported in the agency's record, preventing effective judicial review. That
analysis does not go far enough when the court is confronted with ex parte
contacts whose direction is from the government to the industry and which
are used to implement policy in lieu of informal rulemaking procedures or, as
in ACT, parallel to section 553 procedures.
If the ACT ruling continues to guide the courts and the ex parte con-
tacts-even those raising questions of coercion and government account-
ability-are found to be unreviewable, the FCC seems to have unrestrained
134. Id.
135. 564 F.2d 458, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
136. Id. at 471.
137. The Supreme Court recently has reinforced the idea ofjudicial restraint when informal rulemaking is
involved in Vermont Yankee Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 453 U.S. 519 (1978). In a
unanimous decision the Court stated that as long as an administrative agency met the bare minimum APA § 553
procedures, a court could not impose additional procedural requirements on an agency. The Court stated:
"Absent constitutional constraints or extremely compelling circumstances, the administrative agencies 'should
be free to fashion their own rules of procedure and to pursue methods capable of permitting them to discharge
their multitudinous duties.' " Id. at 1211. Despite this decision, courts have apparently continued to impose
some procedural safeguards on § 553 proceedings, distinguishing the cases or invoking the "basic fairness/need
for effective judicial review" litany traditionally covering agency action. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 6:18 (1978) (citing National Small Shipments Traffic Conference, Inc. v. ICC, 590 F.2d 345 (D.C. Cir.
1978) and United States Lines, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n., 584 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1978)).
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discretion to coerce industry compliance with policy it prefers not to enforce,
for whatever reasons. 38
It is conceivable that the plaintiffs in Writer's Guild will be required to
begin again with their complaint before the FCC and to follow the Communi-
cations Act procedures outlined for one aggrieved by agency action. t39
Should the controversy wind up in the D.C. Circuit on appeal and that court
follow its analysis in ACT, the court will likely (1) find no reviewable agency
action, but rather informal agency action in line with the FCC's charge to
encourage generally the more effective use of television; or (2) find agency
action, require the institution of section 553 informal rulemaking procedures,
and avoid dealing with the substance of the jawboning, treating it as ex parte
contacts safe from judicial probing.
Courts and congressmen have tread lightly in the area of ex parte con-
tacts in informal rulemaking procedures. As a practical matter, they recognize
an agency's dependence on these informal contacts to obtain information, to
obtain cooperation, and to avoid the cumbersome, expensive procedures
when something short of APA-negotiations, jawboning, speeches-can
accomplish the desired end. 140 But the unbridled discretion which traditional
analysis of ex parte contacts allows the FCC has the anomalous effect of
condoning just those agency activities the APA was designed to prevent.
Ex parte contacts are as important to an agency as lobbying is to a con-
gressman. 4' Even lobbying has restrictions placed on it. 42
The bottom line is that the courts must look more closely at the nature of
the ex parte contacts if there is sufficient reason to believe that the agency has
abused its discretion under the guise of permissible informal contacts. Courts
cannot be distracted by the presence of apparently proper administrative
procedures, which may merely camouflage what the agency has actually
done. If the ex parte contacts constitute agency efforts to influence the in-
dustry, the court should examine them to be sure that they are "permissible
regulatory activity" and not "impermissible 'raised eyebrow' harrassment of
vulnerable licensees." 43 Admittedly, distinguishing between the two is often
a difficult task.' 44 In both ACT and Writer's Guild, however, there was ample
138. See text accompanying notes 93-113 supra.
139. See text accompanying note 89 supra.
140. Even in Home Box Office, where the court found ex parte contacts in informal rulemaking
impermissible, the court conceded that the informal contacts between the public and the agency were the "bread
and butter" of the administrative process and completely appropriate within the bounds it defined. 567 F.2d 9,
57 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
141. See text accompanying notes 7-9 supra.
142. See Regulation of Lobbying Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 261, 276 (1976).
143. Writer's Guild of America v. American Broadcasting Co., 609 F.2d 355, 365 (9th Cir. 1979).
144. Robinson, The Federal Communications Commission:An Essay on Regulatory Watchdogs, 64 VA. L.
REV. 169, 230 (1978).
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evidence-publicity in popular and trade press, FCC monitoring of licensees
for compliance with NAB Code changes-that the FCC was doing more than
merely "encouraging" and was doing it despite its own admission that such a
policy enacted by the Commission .would most likely be unconstitutional. 45
Mary R. Brandt
145. See text accompanying notes 63-64 supra.

